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"Our economic analysis has disclosed the fact that it is only the interests
of competing cliques of business men-investors, contractors, export
manufacturers, and certain professional classes-that are antagonistic; that
these cliques, usurping the authority and voice of the people, use the public
resources to push their private interests, and spend the blood and money of the
people in this vast and disastrous military game, feigning national antagonisms
which have no basis in reality."'
* Benedict Sheehy: B.Th., M.A., LL.B., M.A., LL.M. Senior Lecturer in Law, RMIT University
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1961, United States' thirty-fourth President, Dwight Eisenhower,
cautioned: "[I]n the councils of government, we must guard against the
acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the
military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced
power exists and will persist."2 Several decades later, Eisenhower's statement
has changed from a prophecy to the unsettling situation in which we currently
find ourselves. Jennings, in her work on the private military industry writes:
"War... always has been a matter of profit and spoils. What is changing is
how the profits are distributed."3
Participants in the private military industry include a number of well-
known corporations such as Blackwater Consulting USA, Executive Outcomes,
DynCorp, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), Titan, and
California Analysis Center Incorporated (CACI). They have variously been
called mercenaries, security consultants, hired guns, civilian contractors, private
military companies (PMCs), private security companies (PSCs), private military
security companies (PMSCs), and private military firms (PMFs). These
corporations provide services ranging from consulting to logistical support to
full-fledged armed divisions and are a significant part of global politics and
operate in some fifty countries around the world. Although there are significant
definitional and classification questions, for purposes of this paper the term
"PMC" will be used to refer to any private company providing some form of
military support from consulting to fielding active combat groups.
Although the contemporary PMC has gained prominence in the last two
decades, its genesis and utility dates back to the Vietnam War era.4 However,
the end of the Cold War in the 1990s produced dramatic changes in the role of
PMCs in the international arena. A geopolitical power vacuum replaced the
militaristic bipolar international scene, creating an atmosphere for major
militaries in the West to downsize their large-standing armies. The downsizing
of military forces that followed was driven in part by privatization-the shifting
ofpublic ownership, assets, functions, services, management, or tasks to private
hands-on the purported economic impetus of improved efficiency and related
cost savings for Nation-States.
2. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address § IV (Jan. 17, 1961), available at
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/speeches/farewelladdress.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
3. KATHLEEN M. JENNINGS, FAFO, ARMED SERVICES: REGULATING THE PRIVATE MILITARY
INDUSTRY 7 (2006), http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/532/532.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2008).
4. See, e.g., Deven R. Desai, Have Your Cake And Eat It Too: A Proposal For A Layered
Approach To Regulating Private Military Companies, 39 U.S.F. L. REv. 825, 831 (2005). See Deborah
Avant, Privatizing Military Training, 7 (No. 6) FOREIGN POL'Y IN FOCUS (2002), available at
http://www.fpif.org/pdf/vol7/06ifiniltrain.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2008); Michael J. Davidson, Ruck Up;
An Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated with Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield, 29 (No. 2) PUB.
CONT. L.J. 233, 235 (2000).
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As with any privatization, the result was the transfer of certain public
functions, tasks, or services from the State to private actors who then carry out
those functions, tasks, and services on a for-profit basis. PMCs, though in some
forms resembling mercenarism, are a type of privatization. Contemporary
PMCs, unlike their private mercenary predecessors, have developed a
sophisticated business model and a modus operandi compatible with the needs
and strictures of the post-Cold War, state-based international system, and the
corporate form. This sophistication has permitted them to gain both implicit
and explicit legitimacy. Yet, their legitimacy is largely unchallenged even
though the utilization of these private agents compromises the strategic and
physical security of nations and the confidence of the citizenry in the
democratic practices and institutions of the nation. Why? Because PMCs,
though beneficiaries of substantial public dollars, operate at best without public
notification, oversight, approval, or other accountability. A particularly
disturbing issue is that while economic aims are acknowledged to be one driver
of warfare at least implicitly, economic aims are not accepted by the global
populace at large as a main or even appropriate reason for going to war. That
is, a purely economic war would be socially and politically repugnant to the
vast majority of the world's population today.
The problems surrounding violence and war are a tangled and thorny set
of human, legal, political, and economic issues, and these issues are
exacerbated by the introduction of the PMC. This is brought into sharp focus
when one considers that the philosophical/operational spectrum of the PMC
welds together the powerful drivers of violence, money, and suffering in greater
quantities and into closer proximity than ever in history. This toxic mix and its
consequence is evident in the context of comments of Jack London, CEO of
CACI International, Inc.-a leading PMC. In the first conference after the
exposure of his company's involvement in the now infamous and well-
publicized Abu Ghraib torture scandal, rather than express remorse, London
states that he was "delighted" about CACI (albeit in reference to its services
and finances).' Nowhere in his speech was there any remote reference to the
suffering caused by his company's services.6 One cannot but wonder that not
even an internal investigation was flagged even in the face of broken
individuals, shattered families of the torture victims, the trampled dignity of the
Iraqi people, and to top it all, the disgust of the international community.
The trashing of international norms by states is scary and unsettling
enough, but the nightmare is multiplied when non-statal entities become
powerful enough to do so. While the authors do not pass a carte blanche
indictment of all PMCs, the reality is that a number of them possess the
capacity to encroach on powers traditionally reserved to the State yet operate
largely without domestic and international regulation or publicity. It is an actor
5. Jack London, Remarks at Conference, CACI International, Inc., in Unscheduled Material Events
(Form 8-k), Dec. 22, 2005, at Exhibit 99.
6. Id.
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in international affairs, policy and poised for growth. They are, in a sense, an
undeclared arm of the state, in private hands driven by the profit motive well
served and also equally protected by the corporate form. On one hand, the
corporate form, the hallmark of the PMC, has specific benefits and costs that
are very well suited to some aspects of private military operations, such as
ability to amass significant resources for action, secrecy, freedom from public
scrutiny, and rapid response. On the other hand, the corporate form is
exceedingly injurious such as social costs including the damage to democratic
oversight, enforcement of unjust resource allocations, and of course, the
dominance of raw economic power.
As an undeclared arm of the state, the PMC is politically expedient having
proved to be highly advantageous in certain circumstances when states wish to
engage in surreptitious or unpopular violence, yet easy to condemn when states
need to gather political capital. In other words, the PMC has become an
integral actor in the system of governance at both national and international
levels. Such corporations, at least at one level, represent the evolution,
globalization, and corporatization of the age-old mercenary trade. The worry,
of course, is that they operate without the public scrutiny appropriate for
military actors. Indeed, the matter of accountability remains unresolved, in part
because of governments' intention to avoid accountability by using PMCs
amplified in part by the complex nature inherent in the ambiguities of the legal
form of the corporation. As a result, they now have an active role formally and
informally advising governments on various military policy initiatives. The
situation is much the same elsewhere.
This Article focuses on the murky and difficult issues posed by the PMC
and in particular, it examines the significance of utilizing the corporate form in
the privatization of violent services.7 A policy and legal analysis is developed
by focusing on Nation-States and PMCs in the domestic context, reviewing the
State's control of force in de jure and de facto terms before turning to evaluate
the privatization of military goods and services. From that analysis, it goes on
to embrace an ambitious mandate-regulatory paradigms.
H. PROFIT, ECONOMICS, AND VIOLENCE
A safe peaceful environment and fair and effective political process are the
driving and ultimate objectives in developing/maintaining paradigms of
ordering human affairs; meaning achieving this is and ought to be the priority
7. The authors wish to acknowledge that PMCs have made positive contributions in certain
instances. One notes, for example, the well known cases of a frontline fighting force PMC, Executive
Outcomes, in Angola and in Sierra Leone. In both instances the PMC was very effective in bringing an end
to civilian deaths, establishing sufficient order and peace in an environment of chaos and killing to allow real
and ultimately fruitful political negotiations to occur-as violence is inherently a political matter. Further,
the PMC did so at a very reasonable cost, although questions concerning mining concessions remain. See,
e.g., Herb Howe, To Stabilize Tottering African Governments, ARMED FORCES J. INT'L (1997), available at
http'.//www.sandline.com/hotlinks/papers/Armedforces.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2008).
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of all policy decisions. The issue of whether the ordering involves public or
private means, and the related issues of economic efficiency and market
liberties are secondary, as the dominant values supporting human well-being are
at stake. Accordingly, the matter of raw economic motivation for violence is
problematic, and its related sub-issue of violence for profit is highly
problematic.
Humanity's history has demonstrated time and time again that mankind is
not driven by a single over-riding concern, whether capitalism's economic
dominance, communism's brutal equality, or Nietzsche's will to power.
Humans are complex creatures working from a variety of different motivations,
at times congruent and at times conflicting, all needed to make human life
sustainable, worthwhile, and decent. This drive for a sustainable, worthwhile,
decent life embodied in the political processes of the Nation-State should not
be adumbrated by the will of a few with economic power who are prepared to
pay others committed to the delivery of efficient violence to assist the wealthy
who achieve their own narrow goals without due regard for the rest of the
population and its interests. While Clausewitz feared that "political, social,
economic, and religious motives" had become "hopelessly entangled" in
modem warfare,' it may well be that it is and has always been that way.
Nevertheless, his comment alerts us to an important reality-the resort to
violence is too important an action to be left to the boardroom.
Violence is the expression of a number of important complex human
motivators and should not simply be a cheaper or easier means for the greedy
or intransigent to gain power and/or monopolize resources. As these
corporations become larger-both economically and politically---corporate
managers increasingly engage in decision-making traditionally exercised by
politicians.9 While the political process has its own worries and politicians
have their own agendas, it provides at least some level of transparency and
accountability above that offered by the private corporate actor. It is thus
unsettling that PMCs dedicated to profiting by violence or potential violence
have amassed power such that they can affect conflict resolution, world
economic stability, and geo-strategic negotiations, more so that their power
stands unchecked." A further alarm needs to be raised as the PMC, classified
as a non-State actor, enjoys the rights and privileges of a private actor,
including the privileges of free movement, relatively minor scrutiny of action,
the privacy accorded to citizens, and lack of accountability to the general
public, yet carries out the functions of violence traditionally accorded to the
State and subject to the correlated scrutiny and accountability.
8. Eric W. Orts, War andthe Business Corporation, 35 VAND.J.TRANSNAT'LL. 549,559(2002).
9. See id. at 557.
10. Steven Brayton, Outsourcing War: Mercenaries and the Privatization of Peacekeeping, 55
J. IN'L AFF. 303, 308-12 (2002).
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III. THE MERCENARY PROBLEM
Mercenarism, that is the sale of military services, is a problem that needs
to be addressed in the PMC discussion at various levels. It is a problem from
three key perspectives-moral, socio-political, and economic, as we next
outline. First, from a moral perspective, the value of human life is
uncomfortably calculated in financial terms, whether it be with a life insurance
company or a personal injury litigator's discussion with an injured party. The
mercenary receives financial gain for taking human life or at least causing
injury. This connection is troublesome for a number of reasons as discussed in
the previous section. Second, from a socio-political perspective, the interaction
between the State and the commodification of violence in the PMC needs
analysis and explication since the State has been a complicit party in the
creation and maintenance of the PMC. Lastly, the similarities between PMCs
and mercenaries require a nuanced approach to the differences when one
considers that differences create a variegated legal conundrum. These coupled
with the expenditure of the public purse without the normal accountability of
state corporations or parastatals turns back to the second point the
commodification of violence.
A. The State and Mercenarism
A common and appropriate starting point for discussion of the State-PMC
relationship is the familiar and controversial figure, the mercenary soldier-the
person who fights neither for patriotism nor legal duty, but for economic gain.
Generally speaking, mercenaries are internationally condemned and outlawed,
at least nominally. " The simple principle is that civilians should not engage in
violence independent of state authorization or sanction. Indeed, this principle
underlies much of criminal law. This principle encounters a sharp challenge in
the instance of PMCs that carry on activities that seem to fall on the same
paradigm as that of "traditional" mercenaries.' 2 Three factors account for this
state of affairs.' 3 "Firstly, to the extent that such law can be identified, it
provides little guidance regarding the services PMCs provide, whether training
or actual combat."' 4  "Secondly, despite a multitude of declarations and
resolutions by the UN and several anti-mercenary conventions, State practice
does not give rise to an absolute international norm banning the use of
mercenaries."' 5 "Lastly, States have been lax in promulgating and enforcing
11. For a crisp, concise analysis, see Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto & Benedict Sheehy, Contem-
porary Private Military Firms Under International Law: An Unregulated 'Gold Rush,' 26 ADEL. L. REV.
245 (2006).






municipal laws that restrict their citizens' ability to serve" PMCs. 16 The key
reason is that the contemporary PMC, while bearing some philosophical
similarities to the "traditional" mercenary, nonetheless differ in significant
ways operationally. The primary four reasons why states do not equate
mercenaries with PMCs, despite the fact that some PMCs provide combat
services, are elucidated in the next three paragraphs.
First, the definition of mercenary is aimed at identifying and deterring
individual human actors. This aim is evident in the drafting of the 1989
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training
of Mercenaries, which concentrates on the recruitment and use of individual
mercenaries or the status of individual mercenaries if they are captured during
battle. 7 The modem-day reality is that corporations, and not individuals, are
now providing private military services, including traditional mercenary
services-i.e. the provision of offense oriented, combat troops. This corporate
repackaging is the primary reason why States are unable or unwilling to make
direct comparisons between the old individual mercenary and the new corporate
PMCs.
A second reason is that the hallmark of a mercenary-combat for sale-is
not a hallmark shared by the majority of PMCs. Only a small number of PMCs
provide offensive combat services. To date, States have not attempted to
deconstruct the PMC industry by differentiating between the limited numbers
of combat-ready PMCs and the more numerous PMCs that provide support
and/or security services but do not engage in combat as a core business.
Accordingly, for States to regulate PMCs they first must differentiate between
a broad range of PMCs and distinguish not only between PMCs, but between
the activities carried on within a single large PMC that may provide a broad
range of services.' 8
A third reason is that the refined marketing, sophisticated lobbying, and
professional business practices of modem PMCs lends them credibility and
encourages States to treat them differently from mercenaries. 9 While States
view "traditional" mercenaries stereotypically as maverick, malevolent, and
16. Maogoto & Sheehy, supra note 11, at 250.
17. International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries,
G.A. Res. 44/34 art. 5 (2), U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/34 (Dec. 4, 1989), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r034.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2008).
18. The difficulty in so distinguishing lies in the fact that combat and non-combat roles are
invariably linked making any distinction between the two somewhat arbitrary.
19. David Shearer, Outsourcing War, 112 FOREIGN POLY 68, 69 (1998). See also U.N. Econ. &
Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rights, Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as
a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-
Determination, 22, U.N. Doec E/CN.4/1998/31 (Jan. 27, 1998) (prepared by Enrique Bemales Ballesteros),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/dfgdd8b99a7da 1 dbc 125660c0046
b4ad?Opendocument (last visited Sept. 24, 2008).
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individual misfits motivated solely by the prospect of gain they tend to view
PMCs more positively. Indeed PMC executives and lobbyists have often been
used to provide advice to government, and as a result, are viewed as
professional and credible corporate partners. In contradistinction, "traditional"
mercenaries are viewed by States as unreliable and without credibility. The
fourth and final reason why States are reticent to equate PMCs with
mercenaries involves economic rationalism and the trend toward policies that
seek to increase efficiency in the public sector through the introduction of
private-sector competition. In this context, States see financial and political
advantage in using PMCs as cost- effective military service providers.
A stark disparity exists between the international emphasis on prohibiting
mercenary activity and the reality of a vigorous and expanding professional
PMC industry that provides a full range of defense services. This disparity is
significant for States considering how best to integrate PMCs into their national
legal framework and whether or not to regulate the PMC industry. A
significant tension exits between those who believe PMCs should be treated as
just another growing industry able to provide services that were once
government-provided services, and those who believe PMCs should be treated
as pariahs and threats to national and international security-a conservative
approach that parallels the historic perspective on mercenaries and opposes the
commodification of violence holding to the potential of democratic
accountability by maintaining the State monopoly of violence.
Although in form resembling their antecedents, PMCs have developed a
modus operandi compatible with the needs and strictures of the post-Cold War,
state-based international system, leading to both implicit and explicit
legitimacy. Explicit legitimacy is based on the increasing use of PMCs by
countries which lends them a veneer of legitimacy. Implicit legitimacy is
derived from both a lack of vociferous condemnation and their participation in
normal business activities including developing industry associations, market
formations, training, lobbying, and participation in traditional financial markets.
To consolidate their legitimacy, PMCs have taken considerable steps to upgrade
the image of what has historically been an unsavory profession.
Contemporary PMCs are now incorporated businesses listed on the
world's major stock exchanges"0 with employees often recruited from among
the most decorated echelons of various military establishments. PMCs form
part of a security industry that in 2006 had an annual turnover estimated at $100
billion.21 It is not surprising that Fortune 500 and S&P 500 companies have
20. Many PMCs are actually divisions or subsidiaries of such prominent businesses as Northrop-
Grumman, Booz Allen Hamilton, the Carlyle Group, and Bechtel. Jon D. Michaels, BeyondAccountability:
The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH U. L.Q. 1001, 1023
(2004).
21. Blood and Treasure; Mercenaries, ECONOMIST (London), Nov. 4, 2006, at 77.
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taken notice of the potential profits. Regardless of what opinion one has of the
PMC industry, one thing is certain-it is growing and profitable. For instance,
in the United States (one of the key PMC clients) from the 1990s, PMCs
publicly traded on the stock market saw their stock grow at "twice the rate of
the Dow Jones Industrial Average, 22 while in the UK, within a year of the
invasion of Iraq, revenues of UK-based PMCs catapulted from $320 million to
over $1.6 billion.23 Globally overall, the private defense market trebled in value
in a period of less than five years.24
B. The PMCs and Mercenaries: Delineating Uncomfortable Parallels,
Acknowledging Clear Lines
The PMC is an institution established to facilitate and conduct war on
solely and exclusively economic grounds. This issue has been dealt with
historically in discussions on mercenarism and legal instruments designed to
deal with that phenomenon, and need not be dealt with here. However, as the
PMC industry has taken root and boomed, and significant, dramatic military
involvements have occurred, the discussion has morphed from mercenarism
into a discussion of State and international legal and policy response to the
PMC. Predictably, the issues, parties, and position have changed over time. It
is within this emerging dynamic that the authors' contextualize the Article's
central themes and hypotheses. In this regard, delineating the distinction
between mercenary and PMC coupled with the elucidation in the above section,
offers further traction for the subsequent discussions.
One of the many significant distinctions between the PMC and the
traditional Soldier of Fortune is that unlike the odd or casual mercenary whose
participation may be seen as a form of slippage in the regulation of the
battlefield, but unlikely to significantly alter the outcome of the battle, the PMC
is a different type of actor. It has the potential to drastically alter outcomes on
the battlefield. This is mainly because the corporate form and organization of
the PMC allows the massing of resources for conducting warfare well beyond
22. The industry is not limited to mega-corporations. One company on the S&P small cap index,
Cubic Corporation, has focused on electronic defense systems and training to its great benefit. Cubic
Corporation's profits "rose 41% in fiscal 2002, and its stock price tripled" between 1999 and 2003. Nelson
D. Schwartz, The Pentagon's Private Army They Run the Mess Halls. They Program the Weapons. They
Even Recruit Soldiers. And ifAmerica Goes to War Against Iraq, Private Military Companies Will Play a
Bigger Role than Ever Before, FORTUNE, Mar 17. 2003, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/
fortune/fortune archive/2003/03/17/339252/index.htm.
23. The Baghdad Boom; Mercenaries, ECONOMIST (London), Mar. 27, 2004, at 29.
24. See ISMAEL HOSSEIN-ZADEH, GLOBAL RESEARCH, WHY THE US Is NOT LEAVING IRAQ: THE
BOOMING BUSINESS OF WAR PROFITEERS (Jan. 12,2007), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/
issues/iraq/contract/2007/0112warprofiteers.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
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that of individual mercenaries, thus placing it in a position to significantly
impact outcomes on the battlefield.
A further significant distinction involves the PMC shielding. Unlike the
private mercenary, the corporate form allows the PMC to completely escape
legal censure unlike the mercenary who was subject to censure by both local
and international law. PMC involvement in war is shielded as it is deemed the
action of private actors, unaccountable to the public at large, and in many
instances, at arm's length from governmental supervision via private contract.25
Traditionally the right to amass for use of such extensive resources for war
required the scrutiny, approval of and accountability of government and
indirectly the populace, the corporate form of the PMC allows the amassing and
deployment of extensive violent or potentially violent resources to be expended
outside of such an accountability framework. As a secondary consequence, the
PMC is inherently anti-democratic on a scale that individual mercenaries were
never able to attain.
The anti-democratic nature and scale of the PMC, as opposed to
mercenaries armed with light weapons, can further be seen where the PMC is
called in by a government unable to muster sufficient support among the
populace for causes, or where it and/or a government wishes to evade public
scrutiny.26 The undermining of democracy can be seen whether the PMC is
aiding an unpopular dictatorship to maintain control over a restive populace in
a banana republic, or the PMC is the agent of a first-world government assisting
the achievement of its geo-political aims, or aiding multinational corporations
in the suppression of opposition to their operations.
A related concern and distinction between PMCs and mercenaries is that
whereas wars are lost on many issues beyond economic power, the PMC allows
raw economic power to occasionally tip the balance in armed conflicts,
exclusive of all other concerns including rights, justice, equity, and self-
determination. While the principle of "economic might is right" has a long
history in warfare, it has not been determinative, and indeed has on occasion
failed. Despite this poignant factual landscape, the PMC stands to, among other
things, potentially raise the cost in human lives of combatants by causing a
poorly armed but popularly supported uprising or army to continue a struggle
that it may well otherwise have already won based on its wide, "democratic"
support. Coupled with this operationally asymmetry is another pivotal policy
issue-the question of the loss of statal control and oversight since even when
25. P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY
5 1-52 (2003).
26. See Virginia Newell & Benedict Sheehy, Corporate Militaries and States: Actors, Interactions
and Reactions, 41 TEx. INT'L L.J. 67, 69, 71-72, 82-83 (2006).
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contractors do military jobs, they remain private businesses and thus fall
outside the military chain of command and justice systems."
C. PMCs and the State Based International System
As PMCs become larger, they entrench themselves as key players in the
crucial sovereign function of deployment of military force and now stand in a
position to influence and engage traditional governmental exercise of decision-
making power.2 8 PMCs support numerous military operations throughout the
world and act as crucial components in enhancing the capabilities of countries
both in the Third World and in the West. Within the military establishment of
countries of all sizes, thousands of PMC technical experts operate
communications systems, maintain military aircraft, fix weapons systems, link
troops to command centers, and in several cases, train national armies.29 The
heavy reliance on PMCs has contributed to increased private contractor
presence on the battlefield. Many States (small and large) now rely on them for
long-term support for major defense systems.3" With technologically advanced
systems requiring PMCs being responsible for long-term support, military
establishments are losing the capacity to manage and generate the ability to
maintain key components of war, including not only command systems, but also
military communication systems and surveillance apparatus. 3' PMCs are thus
becoming the key supporting actors of military operations, and now stand in a
position to "threaten global order with military force that is less accountable
and controllable than [S]tate militaries."32 PMCs are not waiting passively for
States to interact with them; rather, PMCs are locating themselves strategically
in key militarily strong States and actively lobbying to be retained by States.
Despite the State's right to hold a monopoly on the use of force, there is
nothing natural about this arrangement. The monopolization of force by the
State has never been absolute. The reality, past and present, is that "[a]s long
27. P. W. Singer, Wars, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and
International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521, 536-39 (2006).
28. Orts, supra note 8, at 557.
29. SINGER, supra note 25, at 88-100.
30. See generally DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DOD 5000.2-R, MANDATORY PROCEDURES FOR MAJOR
DEFENSE ACQUISmON PROGRAMS (MDAPS) AND MAJOR AUTOMATED INFO. SYSTEM (MAIS) ACQUISITION
PROGRAMS (2002), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/bei/pm/ref-library/dodi/p50002r.pdf(last visited
Sept. 25, 2006).
31. See Gordon L. Campbell, U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command, Paper Presented at
the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics 2000: Contractors on the Battlefield: The Ethics of
Paying Civilians to Enter Harm's Way and Requiring Soldiers to Depend upon Them (Jan. 27-28, 2000),
available at http://www.usafa.edu/isme/JSCOPE00/Campbell00.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2008).
32. Herbert M. Howe, Global Order and the Privatization of Security, 22 FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF. 1, 1 (1998).
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as humanity has waged war, there have been mercenaries."33 States have not
been averse to incorporating or capturing the "violence of privateers-a form
of violence external to the State-and selectively sanction[ing] it when
profitable" or expedient.34 In centuries past, States often relied on private
organizations chartering companies that had their own military power to
undertake State- sanctioned foreign ventures.35 These ventures included State-
centric activities including founding colonies where States themselves lacked
the finance, and assisting States' in pursuing hegemonic ambitions by offering
extra military muscle.36 In essence, the State's monopolization of force is a
rather recent phenomenon. Indeed, "[u]ntil the mid-nineteenth century, military
knowledge and labor were an alienable commodity in an international
market."37 "Sovereignty bore little or no relation to the control of organized
violence."3
Denationalization of violence to PMCs affects international security by
transforming power from State-organized militaries to private militaries. It
creates a new threat to the traditional Westphalian paradigm of the State as the
natural entity in control of the legal use of lethal military force. This decline
of the Nation-State and the growing role of PMCs are symptoms of a larger
challenge to the aspirations of order in the world as represented by the system
of Nation-States and the rule of law, which is eroded by the alternative system
of corporate bargaining and the rule of might.39
In this new landscape, regardless of whether States choose to interact with
PMCs-that is to retain their services and marshal their capacity or not-and
as a result of the existence of PMCs, States themselves are changing in
character. "[I]nteractions between PMFs and States are generally carried out
in private without the glare of international public scrutiny that typically
surrounds decisions by States to expand, modernize, or mobilize their military
capacity" or take violent action, whether internally or against other States.4 °
Further, the profit- making objective of PMCs undermines legitimacy in their
deployment, and such legitimacy, which is hard enough to determine in
33. Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security
Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 75, 82 (1998).
34. Montgomery Sapone, Have Rifle with Scope, Will Travel: The Global Economy of Mercenary
Violence, 30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 12 (1999).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 10.
38. Id.
39. See John 0. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime
of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 903 (1996). See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A
NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
40. Newell & Sheehy, supra note 26, at 69.
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international politics, becomes even more difficult when billions in potential
profits come into play when PMC contracting becomes part of the equation.
The PMC does not fit into the paradigm of the State as an entity- bearing
monopoly over military force. Commenting on the decentralization of State
control over the use of force, Montgomery Sapone notes: "This change in
military relationship between States and private entities suggests that some
States no longer exert explicit control over military technology or manpower.
Military skill is becoming increasingly privatized and commodified."' The
decentralization of international security from State-organized militaries not
only threatens the traditional Westphalian model of State-monopolized force,42
but also accentuates the inability of international law to hold private actors
accountable.43 One of the dangers of the privatization of force-the dangers of
excessive and arbitrary uses of force-materialized on a large and well-
publicized scale in the recent invasion of Iraq. "The central claim is that private
punishment, policing, and military corporations violate human rights" and
international law obligations more often than public punishment, policing, and
military institutions" in the various scandals that continue to engulf the military
operation in Iraq as it did in earlier controversies.45
IV. PRIVATIZATION AND THE PMC AS PRIVATIZATION OF VIOLENCE
Privatization of defense follows from two historical trajectories. The first
is the events associated with the previously mentioned end of the Cold War.46
Among the major fall-outs of this was the discharge of vast numbers of
employees from militaries of the Communist Block and was the corollary
release of all types of weaponry formerly belonging to national militaries.47
Coincident with this release was a second phase of decolonization marked by
the independence of various former Soviet republics and satellites48 (the first
phase of decolonization is of the last century resulting from the combination of
expulsion and withdrawal of European powers from former colonies around the
41. Sapone, supra note 34, at 20-21.
42. The Westphalian model of state-dominated warfare represents "trinitarian warfare," a principle
whereby the government directs the war, a state-controlled army fights the war, and the people suffer. MARTIN
VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR 38-42 (1991).
43. See Ariadne K. Sacharoff, Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They Be HeldLiable Under
the Alien Tort Claims Act for Human Rights Violations?, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 927, 929 (1998).
44. Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization ofPunishment, Policing, And Military Force
in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REv. 879, 943 (2004).
45. See, e.g., David Kassebaum, A Question of Facts-The Legal Use of Private Security Firms
in Bosnia, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 581 (2000). See also Zarate, supra note 33, at 93-103.
46. SINGER, supra note 25, at 49-5 1.
47. See generally Maogoto & Sheehy, supra note 11.
48. SINGER, supra note 25, at 50.
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globe). Many of these newly formed States, both republics and former
colonies, have generally struggled, and some still do, in successfully establish-
ing their sovereignty, often owing to ineffective national armed services. 49
These factual realities have proved to be significant market drivers creating a
great supply of armaments and personnel welded together by a huge demand for
violent services.
The combination of personnel and resources seeking economic
opportunities in a destabilized world coincided with the other second major
historical trajectory, the neo-liberal commitment to privatization. Neo-liberal
policy makers, as indicated above, argue that the government is an inefficient
means of providing goods and services, and that, government involvement in
their position limits individual opportunity or liberty to participate in the
market.50 So, from a liberal to the greatest extent possible, government should
withdraw from the provision of such. Instead, those services should be sourced
and purchased from the market, including military services.
Indeed from a democratic-capitalist political perspective, other than the
previously discussed theory of State monopoly over violence, there are no
ideological reasons to categorically preclude the privatization of violence. The
incentives that motivate States to contract out existing defense roles to PMCs,
or more radically, to commercialize their own defense forces, are largely
political and economic. As privatization is currently both ideologically and
politically in vogue, it follows that States have legislated to facilitate
privatization including defense.
There are a number of reasons that could explain why States such as the
United States and the United Kingdom, over the last twenty years, have been
so receptive to privatization, and in particular, outsourcing aspects of their
defense sectors. First, there is a long history of private military providers and
therefore a sense of familiarity.5' Second, as a result of the Reagan-Thatcher
changes from the 1980s onwards, there was a nascent military service market
ready to compete with the public defense sector.52 These military-provider
firms, which were primarily providing military hardware up until that time,
from that period onwards, provided logistical support services as well as
49. Id. at 55.
50. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 3, 5 (2005).
51. SeegenerallyHOWARDZINN, APEOPLE'SHISTORYOFTHEUNITED STATES 11-12(20th Anniv.
ed., 1999) (1980).
52. For example, the private aspect of the supply chain of military hardware (the "military industrial
complex") has forged a longstanding relationship between states and private companies and is one facet of
the nascent defense market. In this context, consider the competition between Boeing and Lockheed Martin
to be the preferred supplier of fighter jets during the Cold War.
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military equipment.53 Indeed, services make up majority of privatized defense
spending.54
Finally, the Gulf War accelerated the privatization of defense services.
The vivid television coverage of the Desert Storm campaign brought home the
harsh realities of modem warfare and the value of outsourced military services.
After that war, the U.S. government commissioned studies to explore ways in
which private companies could increase their participation in military
operations by selling more services to U.S. armed forces operating in combat
zones.5 In the wake of the Gulf War, the 1990s saw a proliferation in the size
and number of PMCs worldwide with the value of publicly listed PMCs
growing at twice the rate of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. 6 Earlier
estimates suggested that the total value of the PMC market would rise from
$55.6 billion in 1990 to $202 billion in 2010;" as of 2006, the market had
reached an estimated $100 billion.58 This exponential growth in the PMC
sector suggests that States are increasingly willing to entrust PMCs with the
delivery of defense services. Indeed, it is to be expected that the market would
boom when then U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, published a
piece in Foreign Affairs advocating a privatized defense policy.5 9
V. THE NATION-STATE'S SOVEREIGNTY AND CONTROL OF VIOLENCE
Although the origins of the Nation-State can be traced from the Greek
City-State, through the Roman Empire and Machiavelli of the Middle Ages,60
the modem Nation-State, as it is known to us, in the 2 1 st century is a creature
of the seventeenth century, resulting ultimately and in a crystallized form from
the Peace of Westphalia.6' The Nation-State, as generally defined by
53. Ann R. Markusen, The Case Against Privatizing National Security, 16 (No. 4) GOVERNANCE:
INT'L J. POL'Y, ADMIN., INSTS. 471, 476 (2003).
54. From as back as five decades, the Vietnam War experience marked the genesis of and a
significant increase in contracting and saw the start of the trend of senior military personnel moving to the
private sector and providing services back to their former employment.
55. See Barry Yeoman, Soldiers of Good Fortune, INDEP. WKLY., July 23, 2003, available at
http://www.indyweek.com/gyrobase/Content?oid=oid%3AI9877 (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
56. See Avant, supra note 4.
57. Id.
58. See DEBORAH AVANT, FOREIGN POL'Y RESEARCH INST., PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES AND
THE FUTURE OF WAR (2006), available at http://www.,fpri.org/enotes/200604.military.avant.privatemilitary
companies.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
59. See Donald H. Rumsfeld, Transforming the Military, 81 (No. 3) FOREIGN AFF. 20 (2002).
60. Roscoe Pound, Law and the State-Jurisprudence and Politics, 57 HARv. L. REV. 1193,1194
(1944).
61. JACKSON NYAMUYA MAOGOTO, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
VERSAILLES TO ROME 7-31 (2003). See also STEPHEN C. NEFF, FRIENDS BUT No ALLIES ECONOMIC
LIBERALISM AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 10 (1990).
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international law, is "a person of international law [and] should possess the
following qualifications:
a) a permanent population;
b) defined territory;
c) government; and
d) capacity to enter into relations with other States." 2
This traditional definition, however, has found itself challenged in the
tumultuous times following the collapse of colonial powers and the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, and even more so in the efforts to settle
matters following the dismantling of Yugoslavia.63 The weakness of the
population/territory/foreign relations formula results in the necessity of States,
or would be States, or other international actors to rely on other, more
traditional indicia of Statehood.
One of the fundamental and traditional indicia is the ability to inflict
sufficient levels of violence to establish independence from other parties who
would control the population, the territory, and govern. These indicia were first
seen in the establishment of the Nation-States as legal entities independent of
the auspices of the Church conjoined with the Holy Roman Empire.' This
establishment of Statehood on the basis of violent rebellion, combined with an
unrelenting insistence on independence, has been a hallmark of States ever
since, as seen in such disparate circumstances as the secession of the Thirteen
Colonies to create the United States of America, the rebellions of the Spanish
colonies in South America creating the States of modern-day Latin America,
and more recently the decolonization of Africa.65 From this perspective, the
need and ability to inflict violence and to limit the effect of other violent
behavior is at the foundation of the State.
States by definition are sovereign. That is they are self-contained entities,
not defined by reference to other existing orders, or other parties-although as
noted, recognition by other States is an important part of the claim to
Statehood.66 The idea of sovereignty, as initially conceived of by the sixteenth
62. Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. 881.
63. Colin Warbrick, States and Recognition in International Law, in MALCOLM D. EVANS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 205, 205-06 (2003).
64. MAOGOTO, supra note 61, at 19.
65. Warbrick, supra note 63, at 213-14; discussed in context in Antony Anghie, Finding the
Peripheries: Sovereignty andColonialism in Nineteenth-CenturyInternationalLaw, 40 (No. 1)HARV. INTL
L.J. 1 (1999).




century French thinker, Jean Bodin, was unlimited.67 That is, there was no
lawmaker or law above the State as embodied in the monarch except the laws
of God and Nature.6" Over time, the notion of sovereignty was transferred from
individual monarchs to parliaments, and modified to make it subject to law, and
in particular a Constitution. As Maogoto puts it:
One thing was clear and unanimous: sovereignty embodied the
supreme authority of a State within its territorial sphere excluding
dependence on any other authority, and particularly the authority of
another State. In essence, sovereignty is independence .... It is
internal independence with regard to the liberty of action of a State
inside its border. As comprising the power of a State to exercise
supreme authority over all persons and things within its territory,
sovereignty is territorial supremacy.69
The basis of this independence is the State's ability to impose its will by force.
And, it is this ability that gives rise to the discussion of the monopoly of violence.
A. The Nation-State and the Monopoly of Violence
Implicit in most commentaries concerned with the proliferation of PMCs,
and explicit on some occasions,70 is the belief that the State should have a
monopoly over the use of violence.7 Although the modern formulation of the
idea is attributable to Max Weber72 in States with a common law tradition, one
finds earlier manifestations of the principle, such as the 1689 English Bill of
Rights which states "[t]hat the raising or keeping a standing army within the
kingdom in time of peace, unless it is with consent of Parliament, is against
law.97
3
67. JEAN BODIN, LES Six LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE (1961), cited and discussed in MAOGOTO,
supra note 61, at 8-11.
68. MAOGOTO, supra note 6 1, at 9.
69. Id. at 14. As Maogoto acknowledges, this traditional view of sovereignty is being challenged
on several fronts. An insightful comment in Ivan Simonovic, Relative Sovereignty of the Twenty First
Century, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 371, 371 (2002).
70. See FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, PRIvATE MILITARY COMPANIES: OPTIONS FOR
REGULATION, 2001-02, HC 577, available at http'//www.fco.gov.uk/Files/KFile/mercenaries,0.pdf (last
visited Sept. 25, 2008). A Green Paper is a policy discussion paper drafted by the Executive but authorized
for publication by the Parliament. The aim of a Green Paper is to promote public debate and to inform policy
development.
71. Id. at 15.
72. MAX WEBER, A.M. HENDERSON, &TALCOT PARSONS, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 154 (1964).
73. ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS (1689) (Eng.), available at http-//avalon.law.yale.edu/
17th-century/england.asp (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
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It is the State's monopoly of violence that underpins the international legal
system and justifies the emphasis on State sovereignty.74 It is on this basis that
States are recognized as having the right and capacity to declare war, act in self-
defense, sign peace treaties, etc.75 A second dimension of the doctrine of
sovereignty is that States have the responsibility for protecting individual rights,
a function they could not purport to fulfill if they did not enjoy a monopoly
over violence.76 Third, and often implicit in the discussion, is the notion that
in some way the violence of the State is somehow limited by or answerable to
the populace. 77  Accordingly, any non-State actor engaging in violence,
including mercenaries, PMCs, and terrorists, can readily be classified as a threat
to State sovereignty, and hence, illegitimate.
Given that violence has been the State's ultimate guarantee of sovereignty,
violence has traditionally been carefully regulated within the borders of States.
On a practical level, States have insisted on the de facto control of violence.78
That is, the State's monopoly of violence has been guaranteed by the
development and institutionalization of State-sponsored, nationalist-based
standing armies and police, and the development of State controlled armaments
manufacturers.79 By controlling both the personnel engaged or prepared to
engage in violence, and the weapons they would use, the State secured to itself
control of the means of challenging its sovereignty, and so ensured its continued
existence at least as against those under its control. On the legal level,
constraint on the use of State resort to violence has been through a combination
of constitutional law, administrative law, and the important related legal
principle, the Rule of Law, as it pertains to the State. The discussion now turns
to an examination of the two forms for controlling violence within a sovereign
State, namely practical or de facto control and legal or de jure control of the
State and then the PMC.
B. Nation-State and De Facto Control ofArmed Groups and Armaments
In asserting its de facto control over these groups, States have ensured that
the groups are clearly identifiable, trained, and accountable. Both the personnel
and their weaponry are carefully regulated. Care is taken when the personnel
are recruited, trained, and disciplined (within the means of the State in question
74. MAOGOTO, supra note 61, at 15-3 1.
75. Of course, international law also recognizes principles capable of running contrary to the state
monopoly on violence, such as the right to self-determination of peoples within state boundaries or across
state boundaries.
76. MALCOLM N. SHAw, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1013 (5th ed. 2003).
77. See id. at 8.
78. Id. at 1013.
79. See id. at 639, 1013.
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of course), and the selection of high-ranking officers is done with consideration
given to political as well as strategic abilities. The weapons they are given to
use are also carefully registered and controlled. They are assigned to limited,
restricted areas where they are permitted to amass, train, and discharge
weapons. Even with this care in recruitment, training, discipline, and the
control of weapons, history is replete with examples of State armies rebelling,
overthrowing governments by way of coup d'etat and inflicting violent agendas
on civilians."0 Police history manifests a similar tendency particularly with
respect to violent dealings with local populations. This violence has been used
at times to support and to oppose the government and its policies as well as to
support and oppose the populace.
The other de facto strategy for controlling violence within the Nation-State
has been by control of armaments and weapons industries.8 This strategy has
a long history, and indeed, archaeological excavations in ancient Crete have
unearthed jars of weapons stored in the floors of royal palaces indicating the
recognition of the strategic importance of control of amassed weapons by rulers
thousands of years ago. 2 Arsenals of various sorts have been major enterprises
of nations and indeed have been described as "the largest industrial undertaking
of medieval Europe."83 In the twentieth century, the formerly denominated the
military-industrial complex-now New Military Industrial Complex 84-remains
a major force in business and government around the world. The 2008 budget
of the Department of Defense of the George W. Bush Jr. administration is
seeking $100 billion for weapons acquisition,85 just under 10% of the 2006
annual worldwide military expenditure of $1204 billion.86 Much if not all of
the major weaponry of the twentieth century was developed under the auspices
80. For a general review, see ERIC A. NORDLINGER, SOLDIERS IN POLITICS: MILITARY COUPS AND
GOVERNMENTS 85 (1977); for a more critical examination focused on a specific case, arguing among other
things that a military coup is part of the normal political process, see JOHN SAMUEL FITCH, THE MILITARY
Coup D'E 'TAT AS A POLITICAL PROCESS: EQUADOR, 1948-1966, 149-59 (1977).




84. Ian Mount et al., The New Military Industrial Complex to Arm For Digital-Age War, the
Pentagon Has Turned to a New Generation of Defense Contractors. The Hardware Is Impressive. It's also
Deadly., 4 (No. 2) BUS. 2.0 102, 102 (2003).
85. PAT TOWELL ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, DEFENSE: FY 2008 AuTlIORIZA-
TION AND APPROPRIATIONS 91 (2007), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33999.pdf (last visited Sept. 30,
2008), cited in STEVEN M. KOSIAK, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS, COMPARISON
OF THE FY 2008 HOUSE AND SASC DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILLS 2 (2007), http://www.csbaonline.org/
4Publications/PubLibrary/U.20070813.Comparison of the_/U.20070813.Comparison of the_.pdf (last
visited Sept 25, 2008).
86. Petter StAlenheim et al., Military Expenditure, in SIPRI YEARBOOK 2007: ARMAMENTS,
DISARMAMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 267 (2007).
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of the State.87 From fighterjets and stealth bombers, to the Internet, to precision-
guided bombs and missiles, and nuclear armaments, governments have sought to
control the development and distribution of weaponry in all its forms."8
The State, however, can no longer rely on de facto control over personnel
and weaponry for the regulation of armed groups, including the PMC. One
cause of the loss of de facto control is the end of the Cold-War, when much of
both the personnel and the weaponry, previously so carefully controlled and
regulated, escaped sovereign reigns, and both created and entered a market for
just such goods and services.8 9 Second, a burgeoning black market has evolved
with many surplus weapons entering the black market mainly from former
Eastern Bloc countries as well as a surplus from Western powers downsizing
their militaries post-Cold War. Equally for leading arms manufacturers, the
loss of traditional markets, combined with the explosion of transnational
organized crime, have contributed to the development and growth of non-statal
clients.9" Despite various efforts at regulation of the arms trade, weapons
manufacturers, as profit-driven businesses, have found ways to sell and
distribute arms wherever they find markets.
Efforts to control the black market in weapons have arguably been
unsuccessful.9 As Peter March observes, "[A]lmost all firearms in the black
market were originally manufactured under government control, came from
military stockpiles, or were bought from licensed gun dealers."92 In other
words, a large black market for weapons has made governments' de facto
control not practically possible. In addition to the obstacle represented by the
black market, de facto control is not feasible because modern States never
eliminated the private manufacture and distribution of weapons in the first
87. British American Security Information Council, Transatlantic Security, Conventional Weapons,
Publications, http://www.basicint.org/WT/pubs.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Weapons].
88. An excellent resource on the arms trade is publications section of the British American Security
Information Council website. For a summary review of weaponry and perceived threats, see id.
89. See Jason Freier, Arms and the Terrorist, (No. 9) J. INT'L SEC. AFF. (2005); see also SINGER,
supra note 25, 55-56.
90. See Phil Williams, Transnational Organised Crime and National and International Security:
A GlobalAssessment, in VIRGINIA GAMBA ET. AL., SOCIETY UNDER SIEGE: CRIME, VIOLENCE AND ILLEGAL
WEAPON 36 (1997); R T Naylor, The Rise of the Modern Arms Black Market and the Fall of Supply-Side
Control, in VIRGINIA GAMBA ET. AL., SOCIETY UNDER SIEGE: CRIME, VIOLENCE AND ILLEGAL WEAPON
(1997); ABDELMUSAH & ROBERT CASTLE, BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL, EASTERN
EUROPE'S ARSENALON THE LOOSE: MANAGING LIGHT WEAPONS FLOW TOCONFLICTZONE (1998), available
at http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP26.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
91. Nicholas Marsh, Two Sides of the Same Coin? The Legal and Illegal Trade in Small Arms, 9
BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 217, 226 (2002). See the detailed and well researched article in AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, A CATALOGUE OF FAILURES: G8 ARMS EXPORTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (2003),
[hereinafter Failures], available at http://www.amnesty.orglen/library/asset/lOR30/003/2003/en/dom-IOR
300032003en.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
92. Marsh, supra note 91, at 223.
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place. Furthermore, the changing nature of weaponry and technology is such
that contemporary advanced weaponry may be made from components that may
be dual use and/or sourced through a long obscure supply chain, making it quite
possible for private parties to source and assemble weapons on their own.93
C. Nation-State and De Jure Control ofArmed Groups, Weapons Industries
and Violence
Nation-State control of armed groups and weapons industries is not only
de facto but also de jure. That is to say, the laws of the nation create not only
the existence of the armed forces and police, but create a regulatory framework
allowing the government to ensure the safe, appropriate, and legal use of
violence-at least in theory. Having a framework in place, monitored by
government, accountable to the populace (again theoretically), 94 and subject to
judicial scrutiny and determinations, the independent ability of such armed
groups to control or inflict violence on society is curtailed.
As previously noted, the English Parliament made private- standing armies
illegal in 1689.9' In other words, the State military was the only legitimate
military organization-all other militaries were illegal, and to organize or main-
tain one would be illegal. After the Peace of Westphalia, as Nation-States
developed institutionally, they developed standing armies and the law govern-
ing the existence, activities, and uses of those armies contemporaneously.96
Interestingly, the situation in the United States led to a different view of
the matter, and it may be a bit of an exception to the general rule. Indeed, even
today, the issue of legalities of private militias is not settled at law. As a result
of the Second Amendment, which reads: "A well regulated Militia being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed," Americans have the right to bear arms.97 Despite
on-going litigation, judicial interpretation of the amendment is not settled.
Accordingly, two different circuit courts have held conflicting views on whether
the right is an individual right or a collective right/militia to bear arms.98
93. The reader is referred to the vast literature on this area, perhaps starting with web accessible
resources at Weapons, supra note 87; Failures, supra note 91.
94. Steve Chan & William Safian, Public Opinion as a Constraint Against War: Democracies'
Responses to Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2 FOREIGN POL'Y ANALYSIS 137, 146 (2006).
95. ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 73.
96. See MAOGOTO, supra note 61, at 19-20.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. I1.
98. U.S. v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the right is individual);
Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1191 (9th Cit. 2003) (holding that that the right is collective). For
discussion, see Robert Hardaway et al., The Inconvenient Militia Clause of the Second Amendment: Why
the Supreme Court Declines to Resolve the Debate Over the Right to Bear Arms, 16 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 41, 129 (2002).
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Nevertheless, even in that Nation-State, it is well-established that the right of
private militias to parade and exercise in public is quite restricted.99
Regardless, it is universally accepted that the national military should be
subject to government-legislated control.
The issue of police regulation is quite similar. Police are not free to act
and inflict violence as they see fit. Instead, with the development of modem
policing, arguably with the London constabulary reorganized under Robert Peel
in 1829,0 police have been held accountable by law for their actions.'0 ' Police
can be liable to both criminal and civil prosecution for violent acts carried out
in the course of their duties. 0 2 Police use of force is carefully circumscribed
by law, as is the wearing of uniforms, and the display and discharge of their
weapons.0 3 Where police violate these laws, they will be subjected to legal
sanction like any other member of the public."° Just as the other organized
armed groups in modem society, the military and the police are subject to de
jure control." 5
Private policing has a longer history than public policing in the modem
State. 6 Indeed, policing was a private matter until the early nineteenth
century.'0 7 In the United States and subsequently elsewhere, names such as
Wells-Fargo, Bums, and Pinkerton have become well-known. These and other
private-police providers have lesser legal powers than public police. Like
public police, however, they are subject to the laws governing the behavior of
non-police actors, and generally, in many instances, their status as private
police officers does not offer them additional protection from the liabilities of
their policing actions. In addition, private police may be subject to special
regulation where they interact with the public in an official capacity, wear a
uniform, or otherwise carry restricted weapons. l' Thus police, whether public
or private, are in theory subject to high levels of legal accountability.
99. Hardaway, supra note 98, at 118.
100. Eric Monkkonen, History of Urban Police, 15 CHI. J. 547, 549 (1992).
101. Charles Edwards, Edith Cowan Univ., Paper presented at the Australian Institute of
Criminology History of Crime, Policing and Punishment Conference: Democratic Control of Police: How
19th Century Political Systems Determine Modem Policing Structures 3 Dec. 9-10, 1999. See generally
CHARLES EDWARDS, CHANGING POLICING THEORIES FOR 21ST CENTURY SOCIETIES (2005).
102. See, e.g., the survey in DAVID DIXON, LAW IN POLICING: LEGAL REGULATIONS AND POLICE
PRACTICES (1997).
103. See Milton Lipson, The Private Security: A Retrospective, in THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (Richard D. Lambert ed., 1988) (1890).
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 12.
107. See id.
108. See DIXON, supra note 102, at 72.
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Still it is important to note in the context of de jure control of public and
private police that all is not as well as it might seem in theory. One of the
world's leading experts on policing, Philip Stenning, describes these common
notions of police accountability and control as myths.'0 9 Stenning writes:
A... prevailing myth about private police is that they are not [as]
accountable as public police are. This is... particularly troubling...
because it misleads us about the public police as well as the private
police. The public police are not as effectively accountable as this
myth would have us believe, and private police are certainly not as
unaccountable as the myth suggests. 110
Not only are private police less accountable than public police, but they have
considerably more power than is commonly believed. Again, Stenning is worth
quoting:
A more accurate description of the powers of most private security
personnel would be that they have no fewer powers than.., other
powerful persons and institutions in society whose agents they are.
Even a moment's reflection will make it clear that these people and
institutions are able to wield power over the lives of ordinary citizens
which far exceed those we accord to the public police, let alone
ordinary citizens themselves."'
This comment is important because it highlights the problem associated
with control and accountability of potential violence, particularly in its private
form despite nearly two centuries of lawmaking and regulation. Consider that
in most developed countries, neither the military nor the police are granted
independent discretion as to when they choose to inflict violence on the
populace, and they certainly cannot do so without some accountability to both
the government and the populace. Of course, in countries where the police and
military are more corrupt, accountability to and control by government and the
populace, in general, is not nearly as pervasive. However, such corruption does
not invalidate the principle; rather, it illustrates the point that armed groups
need to be closely watched and accountable to protect civilian interests, create
an environment of safety and peace, and enhance governability of the State.
Despite the huge challenge posed by the presence of potentially violent groups
in society which are accountable to government, in the last decades of the
109. PHILIP STENNING, PRIVATE POLICING-SOME RECENT MYTHS, DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS
147, http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/proceedings/23/Stenning.pdf (last visited Oct 23, 2008).
110. Id. at 149.
111. Id. at 148.
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twentieth century, governments took steps back from immediate control of such
groups by engaging in an exercise of the privatization of defense services.
VI. PRIVATIZATION AND THE CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PRIVATISED DEFENCE FORCES
One of the most significant challenges to the privatization agenda is
maintaining control and accountability. The basic challenge of control and
accountability of violent public services is exacerbated when a State privatizes
the delivery of those services. Given the nature of defense services and the
consequent need for vast sums of money, secrecy, and power, the importance
of control and accountability as well as the risks associated with privatization
are exponentially greater.
In the context of the privatization of defense, as will be shown, the
situation is different, making the accountability of PMCs a matter of urgent
concern particularly in relation to regulation. When public militaries and
governments interact, the interactions have not always been peaceful. Drawing
from the history of such interactions, one should certainly conclude that a
public military does not always act in the public interest. History is replete with
instances in which a military has seized control and been unwilling to give up
power."2 Nevertheless, public militaries often can and do surrender to public
will, particularly when the basis for their legitimacy rests on some notion of
public accountability and maintenance of the Rule of Law. The privatized
defense industry, however, has no such constraints, and indeed, history is
replete with examples of PMCs running amok, uninhibited by any allegiance
or claim to public legitimacy and constitutionalism. No surprise then that in the
case of controlling privatized defense capabilities and ensuring accountability,
the record is appalling.
There have been a shocking number of serious abuses by PMCs of their
de facto powers. These include fraud, corruption, and deceit, including failing
to warn a government it has been hired to protect, but in fact, participating in
the overthrow of that government in favor of a preferred government." 3 Other
incidents are related to exploitative compensation demands including mineral
rights put to cash-strapped governments." 4  As the Iraq experience
demonstrates, there have been few, if any, lessons learned when dealing with
112. One current well known example is the situation in Myanmar (formerly Burma), where an
invidious military dictatorship, calling itself SLORC (the State Law and Order Restoration Council),
maintains its iron grip on power, despite the tireless agitation of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi, and the selfless sacrifices of countless martyrs. See Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's Pages,
http://www.dassk.com/contents.php?id=39 (last visited Sept. 17, 2008).
113. SINGER, supra note 25, at 164-66.
114. Id. at 166.
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PMCs. Companies that have murdered civilians have escaped legal sanction,
and far from being penalized, have either been awarded additional contracts or
continued to enjoy benefits of existing contacts." 5
Perhaps the greatest challenge of accountability has to do with violent
actions undertaken by a PMC extraterritorially in the name of a nation without
corollary accountability to the people of that nation. Unlike other privatized
services, which may be provided extraterritorially, PMC services may well
include intentional death, injury, and challenge to the sovereignty of citizenry.
Services of this nature and potential consequences require a distinctly higher
level of accountability to a nation's people than to the provision of privatized
transport services. Indeed, Rachel Weber, in her detailed study of the defense
industry, argues for a thorough revision of governments' approach to defense
industry contractors; in essence, removing industry participants from the strictly
private sphere based on the nature of their work, subsidies received, and the
level of importance to the nation."6
In South America, consider the early 1980s example of United States
sponsored PMCs supporting the Contras' attacks on the democratically elected
government of El Salvador." 7 That debacle, which was finally brought to an
end by public scrutiny and disclosure of what came to be known as the Iran-
Contra Affair, left El Salvador in shambles with gangs and paramilitaries
running rampant.' 8 No corporate actors were held accountable." 9 in a sign
that this was not a one-off incident, in the early 1990s, the crumbling of
Yugoslavia not only turned the Balkans into a war zone dripping with blood,
but another opportunity for PMCs to "assist" in restoring order through
provision of logistical and training support. 2° However, in the process,
employees of one of the leading PMCs in this theatre, DynCorp, were
implicated in serious human rights violations; the trafficking of women and
running a prostitution ring. 2' Lesser known are events such as those of
Spearhead Ltd.'s training of Colombian drug enforcers whose "non-holds"
barred approach had its list of victims including mayors, provincial governors,
judges, presidential candidates, and civilians massacred.'22 The activities of
115. See id. at 220-22.
116. SeeRACHEL WEBER, SWORDS INTo Dow SHARES: GOVERNING THE DECLINE OF THEMILITARY-
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (2001).
117. WILLI BLUM, KILLING HOPE: U.S. MILITARY AND CIA INTERVENTIONS SINCE WORLD WAR
1 352 (1995) (quoting Frances Fitzgerald, Reagan's Band of True Believers, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1987, at
43).
118. See id. at 352-63.
119. See SINGER, supra note 25, at 221-22.
120. See id. at 4-5.
121. Including sexual slavery, prostitution and illegal arms trade. Id. at 222.
122. For a narrative of the events, see the account of the barrister involved in proceedings in the USA
in GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, THE JUSTICE GAME 241-61 (1998).
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some PMCs, which have left whole regions in ruins, have touched all comers
of the earth-the latest and most publicized being in the Middle East. The
PMC's record in Iraq includes torture, random killings, and massacres, again
without accountability.
One thing that has been a constant in all noted human rights and
humanitarian norm breaches (the raison de etre this Article) has been the
impunity enjoyed by implicated PMCs-neither their employees, directors or
other allied actors have been called to account. These events form the impetus
and drive the necessity to evaluate the issue of accountability of PMCs.
Accountability requires identification, analysis, and evaluation as to whether:
1) the defense services offered by the PMC are legal and the
objectives appropriate whether cast as contract specifications or
broader policy objectives;
2) the services are performed within the bounds of the law;
3) the activities undertaken are fully and truthfully reported; and
4) all breaches of obligations create appropriate avenues of
liability and compensation."'
Singer sets out the nub of the problem thus: "With PMCs, clear tensions
always exist between the security goals of clients and the firms' desire for profit
maximization. For governments, the public good and the good of the private
companies are not identical."' 124 Singer identifies the three main obstacles to
effective control of PMCs, which are set out in the next three paragraphs.
First, among the obstacles to accountability, Singer identifies the problem
of monitoring. 25 From the contract drafting and tendering process, to the
implementation, evaluation, and renewal process, contracting is complex and
hence, difficult to monitor.126 Complexity may be part of any contract monitor-
ing, and transparency poses a particular quagmire for governmental contracting
with the PMC.'27 PMC contracts may be pre-determined or in a highly
specialized niche market that precludes actual competition; therefore, avoiding
market scrutiny and monitoring of its terms or in award. 2' Contracts with
PMCs often take place in highly secret contexts, such as in the course of war.129
In any case, PMCs as private actors dealing with private contracts and having
access to military secrets, are well shielded from public scrutiny. 3 ' The public
123. See SINGER, supra note 25, at 152, 220.
124. Id. at 151.
125. Id. at 152.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. SINGER, supra note 25, at 152.




is, thus, not privy to either private commercial transactions or to military
secrets. Such being the case, it is obvious that PMC contracts may well go
unobserved by public authorities. 3 ' Monitoring is further challenged in the
field when the chain of command is not clear-a complaint made by military
officials-leaving it unclear to where the PMC is accountable and for what. 1
32
The question of accountability becomes even more difficult when parties'
accountabilities are in conflict. The conflict of profit and security is not a
minor matter as was illustrated in a recent incident when the airport in Baghdad
was shut down by the firm engaged to guard it over a pay dispute.
133
A second concern Singer identifies is the profit motive. Whereas one of
the government's neo-liberal objectives of the use of privatized defense service
is the reduced expenditure, the PMCs objective is the opposite. Although the
government seeks to control costs of violent action, the PMC seeks to increase
profits and correlative costs. What particularly distinguishes the PMC-govern-
ment relationship from a business-to-business relationship, however, is that the
nature of the services provided puts the government in a vulnerable position in
two senses. First, where a government has privatized its defense services, it is
no longer in position to substitute its own resources in the event of PMC failure.
Accordingly, it is in a very weak bargaining position, particularly vis-ii-vis an
entrenched PMC providing service in a niche market. Second, services as
opposed to goods, are harder to measure and monitor, and indeed, are easier to
supply at less than agreed levels than goods, and again, particularly so in the
supply of military services.'34 Unsurprisingly, PMCs have encouraged outrage-
ous and notorious cost overruns, including over-charging, billing for ghost
employees, encouraging unwitting military officers whose focus is on strategy
rather than expenditures to take more expensive alternatives, and even outright
fraud."3 The outrages have occurred to such an extent in Iraq that a Senate
Hearing, "Combating War Profiteering: Are We Doing Enough to Investigate
and Prosecute Contracting Fraud and Abuse in Iraq?" was organized. Senator
Leahy reported "untold billions [were] unaccounted for"'36 and the Office of the
Inspector General was only able to report that $9.8 million had been repaid in
131. Id. at 153-54.
132. Id at 153.
133. CHIA LEHNARDT, INST. FOR INT'L LAW AND JUSTICE, REGULATING THE PRIVATE COMMERCIAL
MILITARY SECTOR 8 (1998), http://www.iilj.org/research/documents/12-05WorkshopReport_000.pdf (last
visited Sept. 30, 2008).
134. SINGER, supra note 25, at 153.
135. Examples of such acts are too numerous to mention. One can look at investigations on-going
into contractors in Iraq, defense industry initiate reports, or for a broader discussion, see id. at 155-56.
136. Combating War Profiteering: Are We Doing Enough to Investigate and Prosecute Contracting
Fraud andAbuse in Irag? Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, I I 0th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement
of Patrick J. Leahy, Vt. U.S. Sen.), available at http://fas.org/irp/congress/2007_hr/warprofit.pdf (last visited
Sept. 30, 2008).
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restitution. '37 Thus, on a cost-benefit calculus, the profit motive far outweighs
any penalties, real or potential, encouraging PMCs to avoid controlling and
accounting for costs (financial) and activities (domestic and international
humanitarian violations).
Singer identifies the third issue for the PMC as "Why fight hard?"'38 He
notes the incentives to prolong contracts, protect one's weapons, and
employees. 3 9 Other concerns include the firm's potential reluctance to fight on
the basis of protecting its own commercial interests in certain areas, preferring
to protect its land-based assets over the government's strategic needs and
objectives, or divided loyalties where its employees wish to avoid engaging in
combat against former comrades working for PMCs on the other side of a
conflict, as appears to have happened in Ethiopia. 4 While Singer notes these
negative examples, PMCs have engaged in firefights, apparently, beyond
contractual obligations in certain instances in Iraq.'4 ' The ability to control and
call PMCs to account by legal means such as court-martial is non-existent.
142
It means that accountability and control in the military chain of command
arising from legal sanction is gone.
The issues above have a bearing on the efficiency claim supporting the
neo-liberal privatization policy agenda. A study by U.S. scholar, Markusen
indicates that the predicted efficiencies have not been realized. 43 She wrote:
"No one has been able to evaluate fully the long-term costs and consequences
of extensive privatization of national defense, and the sheer inability to do so
should give pause to advocates of outsourcing anything other than the most
routine functions." 44  Indeed, while standing armies are expensive, the less
accountable and corporately shielded PMCs will almost certainly prove to be
more so, 145 even without counting the costs to democracy and its institutions.
This serves only to add impetus to achieving PMC accountability to the Nation-
State and may well require some radical re-thinking of traditional approaches
137. Id. at 10 (statement of Thomas F. Gimble, Acting Inspector General, Dep't of Defense).
138. SINGER, supra note 25, at 157.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 158.
141. DAVID ISENBERG, BRITISH AMERICAN SECURrrY INFORMATION COUNCIL, A FISTFUL OF
CONTRACTORS: THE CASE FOR A PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES IN IRAQ 31
(2004).
142. SINGER, supra note 25, at 220.
143. See Markusen, supra note 53.
144. Id. at 493.
145. One is tempted to recall the Thirty Years War and the manner in which the Holy Roman
Emperor Ferdinand turned to the financier and mercenary Albrecht Eusebius Wenzel von Wallenstein. See
P.W. Singer, The Ultimate Military Entrepreneur, MIL. HIST. Q. 6, 6-15 (2003) available at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/articles/2003/spring-defense-singer/singer203O3Ol .pdf (last
visited Sept. 30, 2008).
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to control PMCs, as well as reform to corporate and contract law and
regulation. The foregoing discussion of the complexities of accountability and
control associated with the privatization of defense sets the stage for a fresh
analysis of the Nation-State-the corporate PMC relationship and potential for
the de facto and de jure control of the PMC to which we turn next. It should be
noted that in terms of the accountability for violence inflicted extraterritorially,
one cannot be but pessimistic. Laws and courts have been remarkably otiose
in constraining governments in their foreign adventures. Given such, control
of PMCs in that context by legal means is not likely to produce much result.
VII. THE CREATION OF A CORPORATE FRANKENSTEIN
From Sandline International's connections with the British government to
MPRI's relations with the U.S. Army, to the AEGIS, U.S.-CACI, and U.S.
links, PMCs need to court favor with the governments has been at the center of
their cultivation of extensive political connections. Consider, for example, the
current Iraq war. The connections between the PMC and government have
been so close that there has been considerable concern expressed among
scholars and media alike. Isenberg, for example, makes "Political Connections"
leadership, political donations, and lobbying of PMCs the first items of concern
in his ground-breaking work on PMCs in Iraq.'46 As one would expect, the
extraordinary growth of the PMC sector suggests that it will be undertaking all
the normal channels for increasing its business, and particularly, with
government being a main client, a heavy reliance on lobbyists.
The tentacles of the PMC in commercial and political circles are dwarfed
only by their financial ambitions. In 2005, for example, a Blackwater
subsidiary put on a by-invitation-only convention for diplomats, oil companies,
and weapons manufacturers.4 7 Another example of PMC lobby success is that
which followed the gruesome killing and desecration of four Blackwater
employees in Fallujah. That killing lead to the assault on the city and a swell
of patriotism and support for the occupation of Iraq, and the timing of those
events is well known; Blackwater's capitalization on the event is not. The day
after the incident, Blackwater retained the well-connected lobby firm,
Alexander Strategy Group. While the information shared and services rendered
are confidential, and hence, one must be cautious in drawing inferences or
conclusions, the record is that two months later, Blackwater had won a coveted
international security contract valued at $300 million. 4'
146. See ISENBERG, supra note 141, at 39-40.
147. See Jeremy Scahill, A Very Private War, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 1, 2007, available at
http://guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/aug/01/military.usa (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
148. Jeremy Scahill, Bush's Shadow Army, THE NATiON, Apr. 2, 2007, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070402/scahill (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
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In the world of profits, nothing is sacred. In another attempt to drum up
new business, PMC lobbyists have engaged in calling for PMCs to be engaged
in a new line of work--delivery of humanitarian aid and peacekeeping
operations. Doug Brooks, the President of the PMC lobby group, International
Peace Operations Association, claims that westerners fail to grasp the reality of
weak, inept, and corrupt African militaries.'49 Brooks argues that without this
important information about Africa, non-Africans incorrectly assume that
African militaries can attend to African peacekeeping. 50 In line with his views,
Brooks wrote an article for popular consumption advocating surrendering the
problem in Darfur to PMCs.' 5 Unsurprisingly, among a rather significant
lobby,'52 Blackwater has made known its interest in securing a contract for
services in Darfur, making its case in the media in March 2006.' This
intention is supported by Brooks who refers to the well-known cases where
PMCs, Executive Outcomes and Gurkha Security Services, made significant
positive contributions to end the brutal civil wars in Angola and Sierra Leone,
respectively."' It is not at all clear, however, that a few cases produce a norm;
although, it is inappropriate to rule out some tip of the spear PMC assistance in
certain interventions.
A relatively significant amount of opinion and advice on PMCs given to
Congress in a 2007 research report is based on the opinions of the above-
mentioned Brooks.155 In a research report on the subject entitled, "Private
Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues,"
Brooks is mentioned ten times, which is more than the combined input of the
149. See DOUGLAS J. BROOKS, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN, THE BUSINESS
END OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE: PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 45 (1999), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/tradoc/usaic/mipb/1999-3/brooks.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
150. See id Brooks does note the competence of the Botswana forces and a number of unspecified
other forces. See Douglas Brooks, Private Military Service Providers: Africa's Welcome Pariahs, in
GUERRES D'AFRIQuE 69 (2002) [hereinafter Brooks, Africa's Welcome Pariah's], available at
http://www.hoosier84.com/02-00africaswelcomepariahs.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
151. See Douglas Brooks, Ruthless Humanitarianism: Why Ignoring the Private Security Option
in Darfur is a Mistake, GOOD MAGAZINE, available at http://goodmagazine.com/section/Provocations/
ruthlesshumanitarianism (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
152. See Rebecca Weiner, As the International Community Dithers Over Darfur, Private Military
Companies Say They've Got What it Takes to Stop the Carnage, if Only Someone Would Hire Them, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 23, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2006/04/23/peace_
corp/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
153. Anna Leander & Rens van Munster, Private Security Contractors in the Debate about Darfur:
Regulating and Reinforcing Neo-Liberal Governmentality, 21 INT'L RELATIONS 201, 205 (2006).
154. See Brooks, supra note 151.
155. See JENNIFER ELSEA ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PRIVATE SECURITY
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUND LEGAL STATUS AND OTHER ISSUES (2007), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
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world's four leading PMC experts.'5 6 This industry lobby reflects not only a
particular ideology concerning governance, but obviously an agenda to increase
the PMC market through further commoditized violence.157
Professor Anna Leander identifies the issue in its broader, political
context:
... the political processes establishing for what purpose what kind of
force is used are fundamental and PMCs do take part in them and do
shape them .... PMCs are increasingly present as a new cast of
efficient, competent, and apolitical security experts. In this context,
the.., way PMCs (as specialists on violence) shape politics is readily
swept aside and forgotten.158
In the African context, it has been described as: "[PMCs] interpret
political instability in Africa as a market issue, and position themselves
perfectly in that market."' 59  Indeed Brooks, when advocating PMCs
peacekeeping, sees the problem in Africa as a technical issue, and hence,
subject to his exclusively technical solution. 60 For the most part, politics
escapes the discussion except as lamentable obstacles to the PMC solution.' 6'
Brooks does make mention of a mediation group as part of a pre-PMC
deployment procedure, 162 and notes that in the African context: "There are too
many factions involved, too many warlords, and too much money in the offing
for the winner."' 163 However, he fails to address who should get the support of
the PMC or on what basis.
The PMC advocates emphasize how PMCs crave legitimacy."' They
claim PMCs value their good names so highly that there is little or no cause for
156. Id. In her report, Elsea cites or refers to Brooks (ten times), Peter Singer (six times), and
Deborah Avant (twice), Simon Chesterman (once), and Fred Schreier (once).
157. Leander & van Munster, supra note 153, at 202.
158. ANNA LEANDER, COPENHAGEN BUSINESS SCHOOL, REGULATING THE ROLE OF PMCS IN
SHAPING SECURITY AND POLITICS 26 (2005), http://ir.lib.cbs.dk/download/ISBN/x656517890.pdf(last visited
Sept. 30, 2008).
159. Transcript of the Diamond Mercenaries of Africa 116 (ABC Radio National broadcast Aug.
4, 1996), quoted in Abdel Musah, Privatization of Securiy, Arms Proliferation and the Process of State
Collapse in Africa, 33 DEV. & CHANGE 911,921 (2002).
160. DOUGLAS BROOKS, CREATING THE RENAISSANCE PEACE: THE UTILISATION OF PRIVATE
COMPANIES FOR PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA 2 (2000), available at
http://www.sandline.com/pdfs/brooks.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
161. Id. at 10.
162. Id. at 8.
163. Douglass Brooks, Hope for the "Hopeless Continent": Mercenaries (No. 3) TRADERS: J. S.
AFR. REGION 1, 5 (2000) [hereinafter Brooks, Hope], available at http://www.sandline.com/hotlinks/
00_Brooks.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
164. See Brooks, Africa's Welcome Pariah's, supra note 150.
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concern. 6 ' They so emphasize the social benefits of PMCs, economic benefits
of PMCs, and their humanitarian assistance, sprinkled with discussions of
"capacity building" that it begins to sound like PMCs are interested in charity
work.'66 In the midst of all the public service bombast, it becomes difficult to
remember that under discussion is a group of self-interested, profit-seeking
armed individuals whose job it is to fight. Importantly, this picture does not
reflect the views and experiences of some employees on the ground with the
same famed PMCs on the missions in question.'67
The efficacy of the PMC lobby has drawn academic comment. Markusen
observes: "Their congressional success makes it difficult for the nation to adapt
to new security realities and to shift resources toward new approaches such as
peacekeeping missions, negotiated settlements, and economic development in
place of regional warfare."'6 8 This effective lobbying activity calls attention to
a dangerous and fundamental problem with PMCs; there is a combination of
commercial imperative with its marketing spin, disregard of (if not outright
opposition to) political process and worldview that violence is the solution.
The limitation of a worldview is encapsulated in the old adage, "to a man with
a hammer, everything looks like a nail."' 69 This dangerous combination of
issues suggests that PMC industry's activities, connections, and advice to home
governments and in the international community, should be subject to scrutiny
and any advice considered and taken only with utmost caution. After all, policy
makers do not turn to tobacco companies for advice on health issues.
VIII. CONCLUSION: CONTROL OF THE CORPORATION-THE HEADACHES OF
THE PMC AND AVENUES FOR ACCOUNTABILITY
Most States have a legislative framework and extensive regulatory regime
which controls corporations. From the initial enabling provisions of a statute,
to the registration, reporting, internal governance, and winding up of the
corporation, most corporate acts are controlled or at least addressed by a
statutory framework. This framework is in addition to the rules governing
human persons, which, by large, also apply to corporations. Thus, the
corporation occupies one place in the State's overall legislative schema, which
regulates and controls the activities of actors within its internal sovereign
165. Id.
166. See Brooks, Hope, supra note 163.
167. See James Astill, British Mercenaries Find A New Ferocity in Ivory Coast: Shunned By the
West, Soldiers of Fortune Scent New Opportunities in Africa, THE GUARDiAN, Feb. 22, 2003, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/22/westafrica.jamesastill (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
168. Markusen, supra note 53, at 485.
169. Peter Margulies & Laura Corbin, Reliability and the Interests of Justice: Interpreting the




sphere. '70 It follows logically from this that the corporation ought not to dictate
to the State, and morally, that the corporation ought not to threaten the State
with violence. As stated, control of the PMC is done by the State through four
areas of law---contract, corporate, procurement, and regulation aimed at the
industry generally. However, equally as noted, there are a number of specific
problems resulting from the presence of the corporatized mercenary, the PMC.
The concerns about their activities are of such a fundamental and urgent nature
that remedies need to be reconsidered. Fortunately, corporate law is not
without some such remedies at hand for its offspring, the PMC. Focusing on
corporate remedies where violence and State interests are involved, we suggest
the following.
The usual remedy for corporate misdeeds is a fine. Fines are the preferred
mode of punishing a corporation-preferred by both the corporation and the
regulator. They are easier to administer, calculate, and measure, both in terms
of the corporation calculating costs of compliance versus profit for non-
compliance, and in terms of a regulator watching to see whether the fine has
been paid as opposed to some more intrusive, resource-intensive monitoring.
There is the obvious drawback, however, with a financial penalty regime in that
the punishment is paid by the shareholders, not the directors or managers
instigating the non-compliance in the first place. In terms of the PMC, it has
been noted that fines, along with other market-based sanctions, are preferred by
the industry and inadequate in relation to certain harms they may inflict. 7
A second remedy, revocation of a charter, is limited to the power of the
State. It is not at all clear why this remedy, so carefully reserved to the State,
is so seldom invoked. While it may be undesirable to over use it-it is the
equivalent of the death penalty for corporations. Given the interests and high
stakes involved in PMC activities, it should be brought to the forefront as a
remedy to control PMC behavior. Despite States' aversion to using this remedy
against corporate serial offenders, the bleak enforcement and accountability
regime seems to strongly suggest that it is high time the remedy is re-visited.'72
170. This relationship between state and corporation has come under considerable scrutiny and
subjected to serious challenge by the development of multinational corporations. See, e.g., Simonovic, supra
note 69, at 379.
171. SINGER, supra note 27, at 546.
172. Perhaps the most notorious of such corporate offenders is Unocal engaged in some of the exact
same crimes PMC's have committed. A shareholder activist website offers:
Unocal has been involved in some of the worst oil spills and leaks in California
history, and in a polluting sour-gas plant on Lubicon Cree land in Canada, as well as
business negotiations with the Taliban militia of Afghanistan, which practices "gender
apartheid." Organizations have submitted a petition to the Attorney General of
California calling for the revocation of Unocal's corporate charter, due to the
company's "environmental devastation," "complicity in crimes against humanity" in
Burma and elsewhere, and other forms of corporate misconduct. Called "a company
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A second set of recommendations arising from corporate law is the notion of
some form of vetting and control of directors. This could be done by setting
standards to be required of PMC directors. These standards would require
knowledge of more than business or even military matters. It would require a
certain standard of understanding of the laws governing war and human rights.
Where the directors are directing the utilization of the corporation's assets for
such risky, potentially fatal ends, surely something more ought to be demanded
of them than a mere nose for business and a sharp eye for profit. Like other
professionals taking the lives of others into their hands, they ought to be held
to a higher standard-the standard of a professional. Just as doctors and
attorneys are required to have particular education and to swear certain oaths
to pursue something more than mere profit and self-interest, society could
certainly require of directors of PMCs the same. Indeed, given the vast powers
bestowed on directors in the common business corporation, there are increasing
calls among corporate governance experts for just such a regulatory system to
be implemented in various jurisdictions. Experts are suggesting that
professional bodies with examinations, regulation, and powers need to be
established with directors obligated to comply with the regulations.'73 Indeed,
current law in some jurisdictions precludes certain people from being directors
on the basis of prior misdeeds.'74 There is no reason such a framework could
not be developed tailored specifically to the issues surrounding PMCs.
A third set of recommendations from a corporate law perspective would
involve some change to law, namely, dealing with board composition. There
is no reason that board structures cannot be modified to include a representative
on the board of those particular civil interests. This may be done by some form
of government or humanitarian representation on the board. Simply, some non-
business personnel with expertise in international law could be placed on the
Board of Directors so as to ensure compliance with at least the minimal norms
of international law. This approach has been taken with success in the case of
popular efforts to eliminate multinationals' use of sweatshops. In the case of
the PMC, there is no legal or economic reason that a group such as Amnesty
without a country" by Business Week, Unocal is a rogue company. In 1997, Unocal
sold its refineries and Union 76 gas stations to Tosco, making it no longer subject to
any boycott regarding Burma. In support of Burma's democracy movement, we call
on Unocal to completely withdraw from Burma. All corporations should cease
operations in Burma until genuine democracy is in place.
Shareholder Power Home Page, http://www.shareholderpower.com/unocal.htm.
173. BOB GARRATr, THE FISH ROTS FROM THE HEAD: THE CRISIS IN OUR BOARDROOMS:
DEVELOPING THE CRUCIAL SKILLS OF THE COMPETENT DIRECTOR 13 (Profile Books (2003) (1996); NIGEL
KENDALL & ARTHUR KENDALL, REAL WORLD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A PROGRAMME FOR PROFIT-
ENHANCING STEWARDSHIP 9 (1998). See also JEAN JACQUES DU PLESSIS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF
CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 84 (2005).
174. For example, see the Australian legislation, Corporations Act, No. 50 (2001) (Austl.)
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International or the Red Cross-Red Crescent Societies or some other
appropriate body could not have a representative on the Board of Directors-
with adequate corporate funding, of course, to ensure that appropriate informa-
tion is collected and reported in a timely manner.
Further, and especially where direct and overt political ends are to be
engaged violently, as the always the case where "tip of the spear" and other
offensive action is contemplated'75 in PMC operations, there is no reason a
political representative cannot be appointed to the board for purposes of public
accountability. Certainly this idea cannot be objected to as "foreign" to the
nature of the enterprise engaged in by the corporation, for as previously noted,
many of these corporations explicitly identify their objectives as being not only
closely aligned with government objectives, but indeed parroting word-for-word
the political speech of the day. This approach-having a politician on the
board-is part of Chinese corporate law in State-owned enterprises76
Although it may not achieve all the ends hoped in that context, the idea should
still provide some comfort and power ensuring government accountability to the
populace and an implementation of a commitment to democracy.
175. See Singer's classification in P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of Privatized
Military Industry and Its Ramifications dor International Security, 26 INT'L SEC. 186, 200-01 (2004).
176. Company Law of the P.R.C. art. 68-69 (1999) (Adopted at the 5th Sess. of the Standing Comm.
of the 8th Nat'l People's Congress on Dec. 29, 1993, and promulgated by Presidential Order of the P.R.C.
(No. 16) on Dec. 29, 1993, and amended on Dec. 25, 1999), available at http://www.cclaw.net/library/
companylaw.php (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).
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